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Civil Procedure: 
Class Action Fee and Cost Awards1 
 
Morris Ratner 
 
Class-action fee- and cost-award doctrine misaligns the interests 
of class counsel and the class by making the investment of attorney 
time more profitable than investment in case costs. Unlike time 
investment, which may contain a markup in the hourly rate and may 
also be multiplied in the fee award, a class-action lawyer’s 
advancement of litigation costs—including filing fees, expert fees, 
notice costs and other disbursements—is merely reimbursed. This 
uneven treatment of time and cost investment in class-action 
litigation distorts attorney case-investment incentives. 
Predictably, profit-maximizing attorneys will be less inclined to 
pursue high-cost cases, will favor time over cost-intensive 
approaches to case investment, even where cost investment would 
ultimately work to the advantage of class members, and will settle 
prematurely to avoid relatively unprofitable cost-investment points. 
These perverse incentives inhibit justice in high-cost cases. A 
solution—one Professor William Rubenstein and I recently 
proposed—is to enable direct cost profits in class actions, by, for 
example, not just reimbursing costs, but applying a multiplier to cost 
investment.2 
A precursor to and variant of this idea was rejected in the Agent 
Orange litigation in the late 1980s when the Second Circuit reversed 
Judge Jack Weinstein’s decision for awarding a form of indirect cost 
profits—the reallocation of a court-awarded fee by agreement of 
class counsel in order to recognize the value of cost investment.3 The 
Second Circuit asserted ethical impediments to cost profits, 
including, for example, that they created conflicts between class 
counsel and the class. These impediments have remained largely 
unexamined by courts since the 1980s. 
                                                 
1. Summarized and adapted from Morris A. Ratner, Class Counsel 
as Litigation Funders, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271 (2015).  
2. See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit for Costs, 
63 DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 612–13 (2014).  
3. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 
1987).  
30 Scholarship for the Bench [Vol. 1 
 
Times have changed, suggesting that courts may or at least 
should now be open to more completely harnessing class counsel’s 
incentives to fund class actions, and to doing so directly in the initial 
fee and cost award. Judges handling complex and large-scale 
multidistrict litigations have grown increasingly accustomed to 
addressing the financing function of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
preliminary case-management orders, especially in large 
multidistrict-litigation proceedings. Moreover, alternative litigation 
financing has received attention, exposing litigation financing as an 
area undergoing dramatic transformation at the margins, whether or 
not courts choose to guide it.  
Courts may or at least should be more willing in this 
environment to look at change not only at the margins, where 
alternative funders fill some of the litigation-financing gaps, but at 
the center of traditional case financing, where plaintiffs’ counsel act 
as litigation funders of first resort. Finally, class-action fee- and cost-
award doctrine itself has made major strides since Agent Orange 
away from an exclusive focus on time as the yardstick for fees, 
creating via the percentage method the opportunity to value other 
contributions class counsel make, including their role as litigation 
funders. Against this backdrop, this article reexamines the ethics of 
cost profits in class actions, as well as the extent to which existing 
doctrine points towards a measure. 
 
The Disparate Treatment of Time and Costs in Class Litigation 
 
Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ counsel make two types of 
investments in class-action litigation—time and money. Time 
investment includes, literally, the allocation of time—measured in 
hours—by attorneys employed by or who are members of the firm. 
Case-specific cost investment includes two types—in-house services 
and disbursements to third parties. The cost investment necessary to 
advance class actions varies by type of case, but it is the magnitude 
of disbursements to third parties that distinguish these cases. 
Some tasks necessary to advance a litigation matter are nearly 
always accomplished via time investment. Cases raising novel legal 
questions, for example, are likely to be time-intensive, because of the 
amount of research, briefing, and argument they entail. Other tasks 
necessary to advance class litigation can be accomplished either via 
time or cost investment, including projects where technology offers 
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alternatives to the use of attorney labor, such as in the area of 
electronic discovery, which allows firms receiving productions of 
electronic data to select more or less labor-intensive review methods; 
where non-lawyer legal process outsourcing companies (LPOs) are 
available to do the work that would otherwise be done in the first 
instance by the firm’s lawyers; and where either a lawyer or a non-
lawyer specialist could do the same work, such as reviewing client 
medical records. 
Logically, it is all money investment, from the perspective of the 
firm serving as class counsel on a contingent fee basis. To the owners 
of the firm, it costs money to provide overhead for the firm’s lawyers 
to be available to invest time, and that cost can be quantified, e.g., as 
a cost per lawyer, per hour billed. The firm typically dips into the 
same well of capital to pay for both overhead (which may be 
recaptured only via a fee award) and case-specific cost investment 
including disbursements (which are separately reimbursed as costs). 
But the fee- and cost-award jurisprudence treats time and other cost 
investments differently, and thus prompts lawyers to see the two 
types of investments as producing unequal rewards. 
Time investment presents the possibility of being directly 
profitable in any case in which the lodestar method will or may be 
used to calculate the fee. The lodestar method must be used in 
statutory fee shifting cases litigated to judgment (though a 
settlement, even in a statutory fee-shifting case, can involve the 
creation of a common fund that generates a fee using the percentage 
method). Courts also regularly use the lodestar where the value of a 
class settlement is difficult to ascertain, e.g., because it involves non-
monetary relief or an unfinished claims program. The lodestar 
method may be used in most jurisdictions even in common-fund 
cases and is regularly used in such cases as a cross check even when 
the percentage method sets the fee. 
Cost investment, on the other hand, though it can be substantial, 
is merely reimbursed, and produces no direct profit, regardless of the 
methodology used to calculate the fee award. The standard format of 
an order awarding fees calculates the fee award separately from the 
award of costs, noting expressly that costs are reimbursed. While 
some courts have awarded less than the amount of reimbursement 
sought, e.g., on the ground that the costs submitted were 
insufficiently documented or were otherwise excessive, courts do not 
award a direct markup on costs, either by permitting counsel to 
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charge more than the costs actually incurred or by awarding a 
multiplier on such costs. 
Disproportionately rewarding time relative to cost investment 
distorts attorney case-investment decisions in a manner that can 
dramatically affect whether persons with high-cost claims have 
access to quality representation. If we assume that class counsel are 
profit-maximizing, then mapping the distortions is a matter of 
following the money. While a plaintiffs’ class-action law firm may 
be indifferent to the distinction between time and cost investment, it 
can experience direct profits only on time, not costs. 
As a result, the firm will favor time-intensive over cost-intensive 
cases when choosing which cases to pursue; when given a choice, 
will invest attorney time rather than costs in a case, even if paying a 
third-party to perform a necessary litigation task would be cheaper 
for the class; and will face relatively more pressure to settle 
prematurely, especially around major cost-investment points, e.g., 
just before having to invest in high-cost testifying experts. The 
distortion in class counsel’s investment incentives caused by the 
current bias against direct cost profits thus produces agency costs, 
including the loss in welfare experienced by the principal as a result 
of counsel’s disloyalty. 
The strain of mismatched rewards on time and cost investment is 
mostly under the surface, invisible to outside observers, except where 
investing counsel disagree on the allocation of any fee and cost 
award. In many cases, counsel’s investment of time and cost are 
roughly proportional, so that the fee awarded gets allocated in 
roughly the same percentage as the overall contribution of time and 
money. However, in some cases, counsel invest time and costs 
disproportionately. It is in those cases that the uneven treatment of 
time and cost investment is most likely to erupt in the kind of conflict 
that will bubble up to a published decision that reveals the ethical 
concerns animating the uneven treatment of time and cost 
investment. 
Agent Orange is the most famous case. There, at a critical 
juncture in the litigation, existing counsel had depleted their 
resources and needed additional cost investment to continue the 
litigation. To induce such investment, Plaintiffs’ Management 
Committee (PMC) members agreed that cash-investing counsel 
would receive a three-fold return on their cost investment in the 
event of a successful resolution of the case. Fees remaining in the 
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pool (the combined fee and cost award made by the court) after the 
investment payouts would be split in accordance with counsel’s 
relative time investments. Judge Weinstein, recognizing the need to 
properly reward cost-investing counsel, was willing to tolerate this 
reallocation of his fee and cost award.  
The Second Circuit reversed on grounds sounding in ethics and 
procedure: Class counsel’s contractual end-run around the court’s fee 
and cost award conflicted with the principles of reasonable 
compensation in common-fund actions set forth in Second Circuit 
cases, which at that time centered on counsel’s relative time 
investment via the lodestar method. Moreover, the agreement among 
counsel to reward cost investment created impermissible conflicts 
between class counsel and the class because cost-investing counsel 
were focused primarily on their three-fold return rather than on 
maximizing the recovery for the class. Not only was the particular 
allocation agreement among counsel in that case unenforceable but 
the court also suggested that all agreements designed to generate cost 
profits categorically created unacceptable risks of disloyalty.4 
 
The Ethics of Cost Profits 
 
Are profits on cost investment ethical? That inquiry traverses 
three doctrinal boundary lines which, as currently drawn, fail to fully 
acknowledge the distinct role played by plaintiffs’ counsel in class 
actions as litigation financiers and court-appointed fiduciaries: the 
lines between “professional services” and other charges, consent and 
its absence, and permissible and impermissible conflicts.  
When class counsel acts as litigation funder, directly advancing 
case costs, is he providing a professional service on which he can 
reasonably make a direct profit, or is he merely paying a 
disbursement that is ancillary to the professional service he renders? 
The answer to this question largely determines whether costs can be 
a profit center because ethics and class-action fee- and cost-award 
doctrine assume counsel’s professional services in the form of labor 
are presumptively capable of producing direct profit, but that actions 
that merely support the labor function are not. While attorneys in 
other practice settings may not be expected to include litigation 
funding as part of the package of professional services they offer, 
                                                 
4. Id. at 223–24. 
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contingent-fee class counsel must, both as a practical condition of 
being retained by representative plaintiffs and as a formal matter 
pursuant to the criteria Rule 23, provide for appointment of class 
counsel.5 The distinctiveness of contingent-fee class-action practice 
can be recognized either by moving the boundary line between 
professional and other services or by discarding it altogether as a 
heuristic for defining permissible cost profits in that setting. 
To what extent is client consent a necessary precursor to the 
award of cost profits? Under ABA Model Rule 1.5, as interpreted by 
ABA Formal Opinion 93-379, cost investment may be directly 
profitable as long as the bases of cost charges are disclosed to the 
client, preferably at the outset of litigation, and typically in the 
representation agreement that commences the relationship. The 
problem is that both Rule 1.5 and the ABA Opinion interpreting it 
rest on an assumption that the lawyer-client relationship is 
contractual, whereas the lawyer-client relationship in class actions is 
created by court order. In the class setting, there is usually no 
opportunity to disclose cost profits at the outset of the lawyer-client 
relationship because fee and cost awards are made ex post, after a 
favorable judgment for the class has been obtained. The question is 
thus whether it is possible to substitute for or simulate consent in 
class actions to create a space between express individual consent 
and its absence. Substituting for express consent involves shifting 
from a market approach to structuring the lawyer-client relationship 
to a fiduciary one, a familiar move in class-action jurisprudence that 
is accomplished by designating the judge as guardian of the class and 
by giving the court power to appoint and approve any fee and cost 
award to class counsel. Simulated consent is also accomplished by 
the adoption of procedures to enable class-member participation, 
including notice, the opportunity to object to any fee and cost award, 
and the right to opt out. The need for consent—or at least a facsimile 
of consent—thus need not be a barrier to cost profits in class actions. 
Do direct cost profits create conflicts between lawyer and client? 
The Second Circuit expressed skepticism about directly rewarding 
cost investment on that ground in Agent Orange. But the relevant 
question when selecting a fee- and cost-award methodology is not 
whether the award of cost profits creates conflicts between class 
counsel and the class—it surely does. The relevant question is 
                                                 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(iv). 
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whether, on balance, a regime that permits direct cost profits is more 
likely to align the interests of class counsel and class members than 
does a regime that does not. Prohibiting direct cost profits creates 
potential agency costs in all cases in which the lodestar method will 
or may be used to calculate the fee and cost award. These costs 
include the loss in welfare consistently experienced by class 
members as a result of class counsel’s disincentive to make the level 
of cost investment that best serves class members’ interests. If cost 
profits are enabled, conflicts of the kind noted by the Second Circuit 
are likely to arise only in limited settings. If the same firm is making 
both time and cost investment, and if time and cost investment are 
equally rewarded, then there is no incentive to underinvest in 
litigation based on the fact that cost investment is directly profitable. 
The benefit to counsel of premature settlement as a result of the 
availability of direct cost profits arises only if the reward on time and 
cost investment is experienced as unequal, either because multiple 
firms investing in a class action have varying mixes of cost and time 
investment or because time and cost investment are both potentially 
profitable but to different degrees. 
 
Calculating Reasonable Cost Profits 
 
Once we acknowledge that cost profits may be awarded in class 
actions, the question shifts from their permissibility to their measure. 
The most obvious mechanisms for delivering direct cost profits 
would be, as with fees, an initial markup from actual cost to market 
rate (to the extent any gap exists) and an actual or effective multiplier 
on costs. The question is not how such cost profits might be awarded 
but whether our existing doctrinal framework gives courts guidance 
as to the amount of such profits in a given case. 
A useful starting point is Rule 23(h), which authorizes a court 
overseeing a class action to award reasonable attorney’s fees and 
nontaxable costs. In class actions fee and cost award jurisprudence, 
the “market” provides a central touchstone for determining a 
reasonable fee, though jurisdictions’ understanding of and 
commitment to market principles varies. When determining the fee to 
award under the lodestar method, courts assess lawyers’ hourly rates 
by reference to the rates charged by lawyers of similar skill, 
experience, and reputation doing similar work in the relevant market. 
With regard to percentage-fee awards, some courts have looked to 
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percentage awards in similar categories of litigation to establish a 
market measure of reasonableness. What is the market for cost 
investment in litigation against which the reasonableness of direct 
cost profits could be assessed? Though there are additional options, 
two most naturally lend themselves to the project of normalizing of 
rewards on time and cost investment by class counsel: the market 
mimicked by judges acting as would sophisticated and informed 
consumers of legal services; and the market for time investment. 
Judges may mimic the market by positing themselves as 
sophisticated and informed consumers of legal services negotiating 
rewards on time and cost investment at the outset of litigation. Faced 
with a fee- and cost-award petition from successful class counsel at 
the end of a class action, a judge would hew to the agreement a 
sophisticated client would likely have negotiated at the front end. A 
sophisticated client would want to reward counsel in a way that 
minimizes agency costs or, put differently, best aligns the interests of 
class counsel and the class. As a result, the client would be inclined 
to eliminate the bias in favor of time investment. Judges could move 
toward this goal by equalizing the direct reward on time and cost 
investment. For example, in a case where the court is awarding a 
percentage fee using a lodestar cross check, the lodestar cross check 
could include both marked-up time and similarly marked-up costs, 
with the same multiplier applied to both. Judges acting as 
sophisticated consumers might go further, not only normalizing the 
treatment of time and cost investment, but also rewarding counsel for 
getting the right mix of time and cost investment, by, for example, 
putting the burden on counsel to demonstrate they made the kind of 
case investment that produced the greatest net award for the class 
members. 
The market for attorney labor may suggest another measure for 
cost profits. From the investing law firm’s vantage point, time and 
cost investment both involve dollar outlays, time calculated as the 
firm’s overhead per lawyer for each hour of lawyer time available to 
invest, and case-specific cost investment as dollars paid out. From 
the contingent-fee client’s perspective, time and cost investment are 
both necessary. For example, the plaintiff in a product-defect lawsuit 
may need both her attorney’s labor and the testimony of a paid expert 
to establish the defect, causation, or other issues in the case. Both 
types of investment are equally necessary to establish her claim and 
are part of the package of services she expects her lawyer to provide 
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or procure on her behalf. As noted, lawyers enjoy two layers of profit 
on time investment. The first is the gap between the cost to the firm 
of supplying attorney labor and the price per hour charged for that 
labor. A firm might mark up the costs of supplying attorney time by, 
say, 100 percent; if clients are willing to pay that markup, then it 
could be argued that the firm’s market rate includes a 100% profit on 
outlays in general—a rule of thumb that could be applied to all 
outlays, including cost investment. The second source of direct profit 
on time is the multiplier. Professor Brian Fitzpatrick’s 
comprehensive survey of federal class-action settlements and fee 
awards reveals that multipliers on lodestar “ranged from 0.07 to 10.3, 
with a mean of 1.65 and a median of 1.34.”6 Under current practice, 
only time investment is multipliable. In a regime where both time 
and cost investment are multipliable, courts may end up awarding 
lower multipliers to keep the combined amount of fee and cost 
awards under the new regime in line with current norms. That likely 
downward trend in average multipliers can be taken into account as a 
factor in applying the data on rewards on time investment to 
characterize the market for cost investment. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Cost profits have traditionally foundered on ethical shoals. But 
they need not. A proper reading of the applicable ethics rules would 
move (or stop drawing) the boundary lines that have prevented 
parties and courts from more fully exploring opportunities to better 
align the interests of class counsel and class members. Those poorly 
drawn boundaries fail to fully recognize the professional role played 
by class counsel as court-appointed litigation funders. Reasonable 
profits to compensate class counsel for properly performing that 
distinctive role may be grounded in market measures, as to which 
there are ample data. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action 
Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 834 
(2010). 
